



Protect

The Right to International Protection

Civil Society Organisations' attitude and activity analysis



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Civil Society Organisations' attitudes and activity analysis

Simon Usherwood, Open University
Alia Middleton and Carmen Caruso, University of Surrey

An analysis of the attitudes and activity civil society organisations on matters of refugee and migration policy

1. Introduction

The aim of this report is to provide an overview of the key features, activities and attitudes of the landscape of civil society organisations (CSOs) that are connected to refugee and migrant policy. The report draws on new data sets created by the PROTECT project and is novel in its consideration of CSOs that exhibit a full range of attitudes towards refugees and migrants. This reflects a key theme of PROTECT, namely the need to understand the provision of international protection in the round, be that through those that wish to advance and enhance that protection or through those who want to weaken or remove it altogether. By seeking to build a more complete map of CSOs that have a connection to protection issues, it is possible to better understand how these groups can play a role in the development of this arena. The report works with novel data sets that better capture the full spectrum of CSOs that act directly and indirectly on refugees and migrants.

A model of CSO action in international protection is presented in the report. This draws together the key elements – extent of cross-border activity, framing of refugees and types of activity – into a more coherent form that will be of use to both academic and practitioner audiences. Importantly, it provides an integrated overview of CSOs in regard to international protection, regardless of disposition, rather than simply considering those groups that aim to help refugees and migrants: as such, it makes a clear contribution to refugee studies.

The report also underlines the central role that CSOs play in the operation of international protection. While states control much of the international agenda and provision of legal guarantees, it is very often the case that CSOs are the organisations that effect action on the ground and that inform and shape public opinion. As this report highlights, the great diversity of CSO forms and activities provides a significant capacity that is essential for policymakers and other stakeholders to understand.

The report starts with a description of the data sets and their formation, in the context of the wider PROTECT project. It then presents a model of the landscape of CSOs in and around international protection for refugees and migrants, focusing on the various key cleavages that mark out different types of groups. These relate to the differences between national and international groups, the impact of size and the variety of conceptualisations of their target groups. The model closes with a discussion of the very limited penetration to date of the Global Compacts on Refugees and on Migration (GCR/GCM). The final section of the report highlights a number of policy implications for public bodies.

Key findings:

- Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) form a highly diverse network of interconnecting groups that provide a very wide range of direct support to refugees and migrants, as well as engaging in extensive advocacy work;
- All CSOs in our sample that undertake direct support work hold broadly positive views of refugees and migrants, with a world view that is either regionalist or (much more usually) globalist in outlook;
- CSOs that see refugees as a case in themselves are more likely to undertake a broad spectrum of work than are those that frame refugees as examples of humanitarian work;
- Very few nativist or nation-statist CSOs undertake any activities relating directly or indirectly towards refugees or migrants, and those that do treat these groups as part of a wider set of targets;
- The Global Compacts on Refugees and on Migration remain very peripheral to the work of CSO, primarily because they perceive a lack of state buy-in to their effective implementation.

2. Description of the data sets

This report draws on two novel data sets created for the PROTECT project: these can be accessed upon application from the data repository at the University of Stuttgart and will be made publicly available at the conclusion of the project in Spring 2023.¹ The data sets contain the results of a pair of surveys of CSOs conducting during 2021: one sent directly to CSOs; the other a desk-based exercise looking at publicly available materials online.

The surveys draw on a number of key sources in its construction. Firstly, the PROTECT theoretical framework (WP1.1) is the guiding document, with its notion of fundamental cleavages in attitudes towards refugee and migrant protection, which in turn should translate to differences in activities and objectives to be secured. This document strongly shaped the two other main sources. Firstly, the main theoretical piece for the current Work Package (D5.8) used the overall theory to elaborate a number of hypothesised variations across CSOs, by connecting the attitudinal cleavages to a more institutionalist approach of opportunity structures: CSOs are by definition very flexible and adaptable groups, and so might be expected to reflect that in the kind of work they undertake. Secondly, the WP6 survey of public opinion (WP6.2) had constructed a set of questions relating to attitudes that was agreed would be useful to cross-apply to CSOs, in order to strengthen the coordination of subsequent analysis and production of outputs.

From these sources, the WP5 team produced a survey to be sent to CSOs with four main sections. Section A deals with the basics of the CSO's organisation and operation, including connections with other bodies and use of (social) media. Section B replicates the questions of WP6.2 to establish a baseline of the CSO's attitudes relative to the WP1.1 theoretical framework. Section C asks for details of work by the CSO relating to refugees and migrants, both in the field and on an advocacy basis. Finally, Section D handles the CSO's engagement with the two Global Compacts.

The survey was sent out to a list of CSOs in 16 states, based on preliminary research from WP7, which identified organisations mentioned in media and social media coverage of refugee and migration issues in those states. The authors added to this with country-specific knowledge

¹ CSO Survey available at: <https://darus.uni-stuttgart.de/privateurl.xhtml?token=c3371e7b-0ef1-4db2-ae3e-83e05058eb30>. Desk-based survey available at: <https://darus.uni-stuttgart.de/privateurl.xhtml?token=c3371e7b-0ef1-4db2-ae3e-83e05058eb30>.

to capture as wide as possible a number of CSOs: the boundaries for inclusion were solely that there was an evident organisational structure, that it was not a public body or treaty-based international organisation and that it was not a political party (see Section 3 for more on this). The CSO survey returned 43 responses.

The desk-based survey complemented this with another 120 CSOs – drawn from the same initial list – and an abbreviated version of the same content. The main difference was the removal of Section B. Researchers used online searches to compile as much information as possible on structures, operations and stated policy, covering the large majority of CSOs that had been identified outside of the USA, allowing for this report to provide a well-grounded evidence base with which to map out the landscape of activity across Europe and at the international level.

The resultant data sets are not exhaustive, nor are intended to be. In part this is due to the definitional issues discussed in the following section, but more it is a function of the research design, which is explicitly intended to allow us to capture the full range of attitudes within the cleavage model (negative and indifferent as well as positive towards international protection), rather than just those groups that provide services towards refugees. Results from the two surveys have been aggregated for this report.

3. Defining the space

3.1. A literature review

A central issue for this present research is the question of how we can define Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), given that academic interest on these bodies and their multifaceted effects in the public space has grown exponentially in the past two decades (Anheier 2005, Edwards 2011, Heinrich 2005, Salamon & Sokolowski 2006, Bunyan 2013, Rainey et al 2017, Kroger 2018, Unspecified 2001, Steen-Johnsen, Eynaud and Wijkström 2011, Volkhart 2005). Based on a review of more than two decades of research across several disciplines, ranging from sociology to public policy, from political science to international relations, relevant scholarship seems to be at an explanatory crossroads due to the growing number of research projects and studies on the subject, as well as the lack of agreement around the contested concept of *civil society* (Edwards 2011).

We take stock of what are the most pressing issues in this interdisciplinary field of study and the lines of inquiry across different bodies of literature that reflect different perspectives on CSOs. We will then zoom into the core of our research work to outline a novel framework in relation to CSOs which are involved in the realm of refugees and migration and raise more general theoretical questions.

Although the intellectual history of the modern concept of *civil society* can be traced back to 18th century Europe, its definition seemed from the outset fraught with difficulties and prone to historical partiality (cf. Bunyan 2013; Kaldor 2003). Similarly, one trait that has plagued the conceptualisation of *civil society organisation* is its construction as a ‘negative’ definition “wherein organizations are defined less by what they are, and more by what they are not. As such, CSOs are understood as being neither part of the state nor the market” (Hasmath et al. 2019: 272). Indeed, numerous definitions of CSOs provide divergent interpretations of their actual scope, structure/function, and norms. The polysemy of the concept brings about a set of methodological and empirical problems which over time have not coalesced into a rigorous, unitary body of knowledge, thus hindering somehow the process of describing, predicting and explaining, which is part and parcel of scientific knowledge development. To put it simply, if a category is too narrow then the set of candidate CSO examples will be too small and leave out significant evidence, and if it is very broad it will comprise too large a variety of CSOs to

become almost generic, impairing eventually the possibility to compare or accumulate systematically a coherent repository of information (cf. Anheier 2014).

For the purpose of this work we will use Edwards' elaboration (2011) "civil society organizations cover a huge range of entities of different types, sizes, purposes, and levels of formality, including community or grassroots associations, social movements, labour unions, professional groups, advocacy and development NGOs, formally registered nonprofits, social enterprises, and many others" (Edwards 2011: 8). It is worth noting that the author stresses the interaction between these entities and the institutions of the nation-state and the market, delineating the idea of "ecosystems" which vary widely in their details from one context to another (Edwards 2011; cf. also Pallas and Uhlin 2014). Additionally, until 2010s the concept bore some ethnic connotation "dating back to the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville in mid-nineteenth-century America which placed voluntary associations of various kinds at the center of civil society thinking and action [...], stimulat[ing] the export of models developed in North America and Western Europe to other parts of the world with unsurprisingly disappointing results (Edwards 2011: 7).

Therefore examining civil society organisations in isolation would be reductive. With some variations, this is also echoed by other leading outputs in the civil society pantheon, such as the World Economic Forum's report *The role of civil society* (2013) or other noteworthy contributions which add to the literature by shifting the definition syntactically, that is, "organised civil society" (Bee and Guerrina 2014), or semantically, "multi-purpose hybrid voluntary organizations" (Yehekel and Gidron 2005). The latter complicate the picture as they deliberately incorporate a mix of organizational features from volunteer-run associations, social movements and nonprofit service organizations and offer an interesting perspective on how variables, such as: strategies, goals, values, membership, relationships vis-à-vis the state or other institutions, and play a role in meeting the needs or advancing the cause of certain (i.e. marginalized) groups. This expanded empirical approach signals the possibility not only to capture simultaneously different dimensions at a given time, but also to address more adequately the changes that organizations may undergo as they traverse through the complex field of civil society. As groups or associations may alter their relations to the state throughout their life course (i.e. from neutral to cooperative or conflictual), it is useful to dispose of analytical tools to detect where boundaries become fluid and capture the dynamics of interaction.

However, this represents only one of the several perspectives that have been advanced to study civil society organisations. Just like the concept of civil society cuts across disciplinary boundaries and brings into focus some of the longstanding questions about the relationship between economy, polity and society, likewise scholarship around CSOs tends to grapple with specific aspects which are often complementary or ancillary, rather than contradictory or rival. This holds true also for another factor that intervenes to add a layer of complexity, such as the growing influence exerted by civil society interests organized internationally.

Some scholars date to 1940s the emergence of what we know as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as Oxfam and World Vision, to promote long-term economic, social, and political progress across the world (Edwards 2011;). Yet the literature seems to concur that in the 1970s there is an upsurge of aid channelled through NGOs as a share of all aid flows from OECD countries to developing countries (Anheier 2005). Even within this microcosm the label NGO became too broad and erratic to be almost inconclusive: initially it was applied to entities working internationally, eventually this gained them the additional attribute of being formally "developmental" (NGDO). However, this was not adopted systematically and "[...] dissatisfaction with the catch-all nature of the negative descriptor "nongovernmental" abetted a terminological evolution including private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in the United States and voluntary development organizations (VDOs)

in India; as well as nonprofit organizations (NPOs), third sector organizations (TSOs) and, more recently, civil society organizations (CSOs) worldwide” (Edwards 2011: 43).

What we ought to consider here is that without uniformity of focus, categories may overlap or diverge. The plethora of classifications which may privilege one aspect over another (i.e. legal and financial, structural-operational, type and scale of organizational membership, accountability or legitimacy of civil society actors) without a robust, multidisciplinary framework and culturally sensitive analytical tools hampers the possibility to compare CSOs typologies across the globe.

On the other hand, we cannot neglect the proliferation of transnational forms of citizens’ engagement parallel to the expansion of globalization and increased interconnectivity (whether in terms of utility systems, financial markets, or communication tools). Well-known examples of these phenomena include, for example, the International Coalition of Sans-papiers and Migrants or the global justice network Indymedia (Chimienti and Solomos 2020). While many dispute the extent to which contacts created through electronic communication can replace real social ties, and animate the mechanisms of trust and “civic-ness” associated with the classic public sphere, it is clear that such form of engagement plays a growing role in mobilization and campaigning. If this can account for a “global civil society” it is still a matter of discussion, as some scholars define it as “organizations that are professionalized, institutionalized, and focused around specific causes” (Edwards 2011: 72) whereas others refer to “a force for democratic change, one which is implicitly making claims to global citizenship” (Edwards 2011: 92). In particular, this latter idea may appear loose but it leaves room for a universe of actors that are concerned in different ways with affecting global governance. Indeed it may include “forms of association such as international networks, social movements, and campaigns; international federations and confederations of churches, professional, and business associations; cross-border membership-based organizations of the poor; and nongovernmental organizations that are oriented towards the global arena” (Edwards 2011: 94).

In this same global arena, the impact of the 2008-2010 economic crisis, austerity measures – a label under which the state progressively has retrenched from its role as welfare provider (Featherstone et al, 2012; Dagdeviren et al, 2019) - and the recent challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic have compounded the insecurities around economics, food, health, the environment and how it has affected vulnerable communities across the globe. The widespread rise in the levels of poverty and social marginalization has determined a resurgence in associational life in different national settings: Greece (Simiti 2017), UK (Caruso, McAreavey and Sirkeci 2022], Nigeria (Obadare 2015), Turkey (Özdora Akşak and Dimitrova 2021) to name a few.

If this has been hailed by some as ‘the revival of civil society’, either as a result of citizens’ claiming their role in the public sphere or by public institutions eliciting more participation (see Bee and Guerrina 2016, Kroger 2018), nonetheless there is growing scepticism among critical scholars about the metamorphosis of *civil society organisations* when they assume part of the state’s social function in light of the neoliberal ascendance in the public sector (Edwards 2011; McAreavey et al 2016). This applies also to CSOs which are active in the realm of migration issues: with respect to human mobility and support to incoming population, studies have shown that several civil society organisations have been at the forefront of delivering various social, political and cultural services as the state retreats from its social obligations (cf. Simiti 2017, Özdora Akşak and Dimitrova 2021).

3.2. Application in the realm of refugees and migrants

As much as the literature problematises the nature and operation of CSOs, it is still possible to mark out a set of parameters within which we can usefully consider their presence and activities in relation to refugees and migrants.

Central to this is the use of PROTECT surveys of media and social media coverage of refugees and migration issues in multiple states and languages (see Sicakkan & Heiberger 2022, Heiberger *et al* 2022 for other applications). Working from key terms in the debates on these matters, it was possible to build a corpus of text that could be mined for any and all organisations proximally connected to it. Crucially, this proximity made no assumptions about either the nature of the connection or about the type of organisation: groups were identified through an automated process of identifying groups via a match-up against Wikipedia entries (as a suitably broad-based repository with self-defined categories). The resultant list was then checked by human coders to ensure consistency as well as rigour. The identification of CSOs then proceeded on the basis of a negative exclusion: only those bodies that were formal state institutions, public international organisations or political parties were removed from the list. Again, this sought to preserve the maximum amount of diversity of organisation as the starting point for the surveys, still with no *a priori* assumption about how (or even whether) they engage with refugees or migrants. Only after this list was produced did PROTECT team members add additional groups that they were aware of in the target countries that had not been picked up by the initial media/social media surveys.

Consequently, the present data sets include the full gamut of bodies that might lay claim to the label of CSO: conventional NGOs and INGOs; religious bodies; private businesses; think tanks and academic bodies. While in practice many of these did not display any active connection to refugees or migrants, that initial association in the media/social media surveys has allowed for a more broadly framed analysis of how civil society in general sits in and around such matters, so better operationalising Sicakkan's (2021) cleavage approach. At the same time, the diversity also reflects back on the literature already reviewed and invites us to consider once again the extreme degree of flexibility of forms and actions that CSOs can undertake. Precisely because of the relative lack of constraint, such groups can adopt whatever approach best works for their needs and those of their target audiences.

In so doing, we make a contribution to existing studies of CSOs in relation to refugees: these have typically focused only on those groups that have been positively disposed to supporting these individuals, rather than exploring the extent to which less supportive and/or critical CSOs might be active too (for example, see Gatrell 2019, Mayblin & James 2019, Garkisch *et al* 2017, Lester 2005). While existing work has done much to explore how CSOs can provide a network of support and advocacy, it is important also to reflect on whether this is counterweighted by opposing activity from groups with different objectives in mind.

4. A model of the CSO landscape

In order to make more sense of the data sets, we propose here a model of CSO activity and attitudes that aims to highlight a number of key factors. The presence of several hundreds of CSOs globally that have some connection to international protection is a reflection of both the particular role that they play within this domain and the nature of CSOs (Usherwood 2021). CSOs sit in an intermediary position between society at large and the more formal political sphere, acting as agents of concerned and mobilised individuals to give expression to their interests and priorities. It is exactly this position that generates such diversity of form and activity, since there is no obligation on what any given group may so; indeed, this also means that differences of opinion among individuals about what to do can be often most easily

resolved by splitting into different organisations. The result is that CSOs are typically very specialised in their focus and their work. As earlier research has highlighted (Usherwood *et al*, 2022), as much as it is important to understand the work of individual groups, so too is it essential to have an understanding of the overall landscape, since the division of work across the board is also a function of who else is present: the impact of CSOs can only be fully understood in the cumulative sense, as it is only at this level that the full range of engaged social interests is revealed.

4.1. The relationship between national and international CSOs

A useful starting point to begin to differentiate CSOs is the location of their activities, and more particularly whether they engage in work in more than one state. Given the intrinsically cross-border nature of refugee- and migration-based work, understanding when and why CSOs form themselves to match this offers a number of insights.

Of the CSOs surveyed, the highest proportion were based in the UK (28.4%), then in the USA (19.8) and Italy (16%). However geographical headquarters were widely distributed, with CSOs in the survey also based as widely as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Brazil and Russia, reflecting both the global nature of this work and the salience across a very wide range of political and economic systems. At the same time, the survey did not identify any CSOs based in countries of refugee transmission: this is not because they do not exist, but rather that our survey focuses on European and international groups meant they would only be picked up if they had an international profile. This suggests that their activities are primarily nationally-based and that their connection to international and/or global networks is as a receiver of others' activities, rather than as a producer of policy or aid: in the context of improving refugee and migrant voices in global policy-making this is undoubtedly a barrier.

Over half (54.9%) of the surveyed organisations did not have staff on the ground in countries other than their head office. However, this is not equally geographically distributed amongst CSOs. Italian, USA and UK based CSOs had the highest frequency of no staff overseas. Examining the proportion of no overseas staff for these three countries also presents some interesting results – half of UK-based CSOs had no overseas staff, just under a third (31%) for US-based organisations, but a majority of Italian CSOs did not have staff based overseas (73%). While some caution should be ascribed due to the sample, as Italy in particular has been a migration hotspot since 2015, CSOs based in the country are mainly focusing their resources internally. This is also echoed in other migration hotspots – three quarters of the Greek CSOs surveyed did not have resources overseas.

Where organisations have overseas staff resources, almost all (92%) operate in multiple other countries. Those organisations which only have resources in one other country present an interesting mix between those who are based on the same continent (a German CSO has staff in Belgium; a Dutch CSO has staff in Greece) and those based further afield (a US-based CSO has staff in Bangladesh).

As seen in Table 1 below, when CSOs operate in more than one country, the distribution is relatively even. Examining the locations of the other countries of operation versus the location of the CSO's headquarters, we can broadly divide CSOs into single-state operators, regional hubs, inter-continental hubs and global hubs. Over half of the sample only work in one country (such as Women for Refugee Women in the UK). Regional hubs focus their resources on the same continent and typically in the neighbouring locale (for example MEDIN: a Greek CSO also focusing on Albania and Serbia). Inter-continental hubs focus their resources on neighbouring continents (for example Inter-American Dialogue, a US-based CSO focusing on Canada, Brazil, Jamaica, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, Argentina), while global hubs (e.g. Amnesty International, who operate in over seventy states) spread their resources more widely.

Table 1: CSOs and cross-border operations

Number of countries in which CSOs operate beyond the country of their headquarters	Volume
0	54.9% (89)
1	3.7% (6)
2-5	9.3% (15)
6-10	9.3% (15)
11-49	8.6% (14)
50-99	6.8% (11)
100 and above	7.4% (12)

Note: n = 162, figures in parentheses are n per category.

The logics for whether or not to operate across borders are driven in large part by the range of CSOs included in the survey: recall that there is no *a priori* assumption made about the nature of any given CSO's interest in issues of refugees or migration, only that they have been connected in public debate with that issue. This is clearly seen in if we look at the extent to which groups consider refugees, asylum-seeking, or migration to be important in their work. Based on data available for 86% of the desk-based survey sample (Table 2), it is possible to see a clear pattern across all three issues: single-state CSOs are much more likely to rate these topics as not at all important to their work, reflecting other interests that are less likely to require cross-border activity. By contrast, multi-state CSOs are much more likely to rate them as quite important in their work, so pulling them towards activities that need a presence overseas.

At this stage we also note that while there is a significant correlation in the overall pattern of CSO perceptions of the importance of refugees and asylum-seeking, when directly comparing the attitudes of CSOs on refugees with the same CSO's opinion of asylum seekers, there is some variation. 13.8% of CSO who regard refugees as essential to their work see asylum seekers as less important. This disparity is more evident for those CSOs who see refugees as quite important to their work; 30% perceive asylum seekers to be not very important to their work. It is not therefore a foregone conclusion that a CSO working with refugees will also work with asylum seekers. This differentiation reflects the degree to which CSOs adopt finely graded distinctions about their work and how they frame this to others.

Table 2: Importance of refugees, asylum-seeking or migration to a CSO's work

	Issue		
	<i>Refugees</i>	<i>Asylum-seeking</i>	<i>Migration</i>
<i>All CSOs in sample</i>			
Essential	25.9% (36)	22.3% (31)	24.5% (34)
Quite important	28.8% (40)	23.7% (33)	27.3% (38)
Neutral	1.4% (2)	1.4% (2)	2.1% (3)
Not very important	29.5% (41)	33.1% (46)	30.2% (42)
Not at all important	14.4% (20)	19.4% (27)	15.8% (22)
<i>Single-state CSOs</i>			
Essential	27.0% (17)	23.8% (15)	23.8% (15)
Quite important	15.9% (10)	17.5% (11)	19.0% (12)
Neutral	0% (0)	1.6% (1)	3.2% (2)
Not very important	31.7% (20)	28.6% (18)	30.2% (19)
Not at all important	22.2% (14)	28.6% (18)	23.8% (15)
<i>Multi-state CSOs</i>			
Essential	25.0% (19)	21.0% (16)	25.0% (19)
Quite important	39.5% (30)	28.9% (22)	34.2% (26)
Neutral	0% (0)	1.6% (1)	1.6% (1)
Not very important	27.6% (21)	36.7% (28)	30.3% (23)
Not at all important	7.9% (6)	11.8% (9)	9.2% (7)

Note: figures in table are percentages, n in parentheses. Overall n=162 valid cases, single state = 63 multi-state = 76. N varies due to missing data.

Of the CSOs for which we have data on staff activities, 48.5% of have staff in the field employed on migration work. Once again, it is UK, US and Italian-based organisations who are the largest numerical contributors to CSOs with staff in the field. However, if we consider the proportion of CSOs with field staff within countries, there are some key patterns. In both the case of UK and USA-based CSOs, only a minority of them (39.1% and 37.5% respectively) have staff in the field. 53.8% of Italian-based organisations have staff in the field. For other countries, although we have data from fewer CSOs, they all have staff in the field (Denmark, Russia, South Africa, Norway etc.). Dividing this into whether the CSO is classified as a single state or multistate actor, we see a higher portion of multistate CSOs considering economic migration as essential to their work than single state organisations, although this is a minority of responses for both. Reflecting the overall figures, we see a majority of multi-state CSOs perceiving migration overall as essential or quite important for their work. Yet overall, a minority (44.3%) of single state CSOs consider it positively. Single state CSO are more likely to consider migration and economic migration is not very or not at all important to their work than multi-state CSOs.

The key conclusions here are that CSOs that do take refugees and migration to be an important part of their work typically reflect that in their organisation territorially. This means a tendency to operate multi-nationally, with a cluster of very internationalised or global operators providing a broad network of support and community into which more localised

bodies can connect. The Red Cross network is the archetype of this global network, reflecting within itself how different elements can be joined and reinforced: while the strongly discrete separation of national sections is very particular, the sharing of resources produces an amplification of the effects on the ground. This points to a more general observation that CSOs work as part of a network, rather than as stand-alone bodies.

This networking is evident at a number of levels. Within our survey, we find that 54.3% of CSOs have interacted with national governments since 2018. Of these, 23.8% have interacted with the UK government, and for most of these CSOs, they have only interacted with the UK government. Comparing these interactions with the site of the national headquarters for the CSO, it is perhaps no surprise that the majority of CSOs that have only worked with the UK government are based in the UK (reflecting the need to coordinate and navigate national regulatory systems). Most CSOs work with multiple national governments, and the dynamic nature of their activities is emphasised by the 13.6% who specifically identify working with national governments wherever there is an on-going operation.

Beyond national governments, a minority of CSOs (37.6%) work with international organisations. Those that do cluster around three/four key organisations; the largest being UNCHR, followed by the EU, then the UN more generally and the International Organisation for Migration. These interactions come primarily from the large multi-state CSOs and from the most significant national CSOs in the field (e.g. the Danish Refugee Council) and reflect the overlap in competences of the international organisations and the interests of the CSOs. The data for political party cooperation is patchy, but for the small proportion we have it for, the majority do not cooperate with political parties, with several explicitly identifying themselves in freeform comments as apolitical. For the very few CSOs who do work with political parties, they mostly work with multiple parties both within the borders of the country in which their headquarters is based, and beyond.

Finally, and most significantly, we have data from 42.5% of CSOs in relation to their cooperation with other organisations (including other CSOs) since 2018; 94.3% of these CSOs identify at least one other organisation they work with. This pervasive cooperation highlights a number of factors. Individual CSOs take on relatively specialised roles and sets of activities (see Section 4.2) and so need to work with counterparts to access non-core audiences and resources. Moreover, those resources remain relatively constrained (see Usherwood *et al* 2022), so the ability to share with others is mutually beneficial, especially given that most CSO work is (usually) non-competitive: even in situations such as the Greek camps, where numerous bodies significantly overlap in their provision, tensions over duplication and inefficiencies are typically resolvable (cf. Skleparis Armakolas 2016).

More typical is the building of institutionalised relationships. The Danish and Norwegian Refugee Council model is the fullest expression of this, which member groups reallocating significant proportions of their resourcing to build a central infrastructure that can generate sizeable economies of scale. Coordination of campaigning and/or fund-raising is more common: the UK's Disasters Emergency Committee provides a single focus for major events and protocols for optimising disbursements according to members' capacities on particular activities. Likewise, *ad hoc* coordination is repeatedly seen, from lobbying on national or international legislation to managing in-field operations.

Interaction with other bodies seems to be innate to CSOs' nature: our sample does not produce any examples of bodies that have any dealings with refugee or migration issues that do not work in some way with others. This reaffirms our theoretical model's assumptions that CSOs have to be seen in the round rather than on an individual basis.

4.2. CSO activities

The wide variety of forms that CSOs take, as discussed in Section 4.1 is also seen in a broad range of activities. At the most general level, groups concern themselves with activities that are directed immediately towards refugees and migrants and/or that aim to shape broader environments for them.

Within the direct activity area there is a diverse range of field-based activities, as seen in Figure 1. Almost all CSOs in our sample that state an interest in refugees or migrants undertake some form of direct activity: the only exception is The Elders, which lacks any significant structure to do more than its report writing and lobbying. Most commonly we seen humanitarian support, education and legal case work; all areas where the specialist provision meets immediate needs that cannot be generated autonomously by the target groups. However, it is the breadth of provision that is most striking: CSOs typically focus their field activities into one or two of these categories only, so it is through the cooperation and coordination previously noted that generates the diversity found. This produces something of a trade-off for refugees and migrants: while support on almost every aspect of their situation can be found somewhere, there are few “one-stop-shops” that can provide a full suite of services, so moving between and across organisations is necessary. Even with the cooperation of those bodies, this still increases the demands on often vulnerable individuals with limited capacity to navigate an unfamiliar and complex landscape.

Figure 1: CSO field-based activities (number of CSOs mentioning this)





Figure 2: CSO indirect activities (number of CSOs mentioning this)



By contrast, indirect activities are more limited in their variety (see Figure 2). Again, such work is pervasive among CSOs interested in refugees and migrants, most groups engage in lobbying of politicians, public campaigning, media interviews or mounting legal challenges (Rotary International is a rare example of one body that does not do this alongside their direct work). Data is missing for 16% of the total sample: 39.7% do not do other indirect types of work (so majority do). Of those, 67% lobby, 51.2% do briefings, 47.5% campaign (three most popular other forms of activity). Such work is ultimately intended to shape environments for refugees and migrants (always positively among our sample) by raising awareness, increasing support and adapting local regulations and attitudes where these generate tensions. By its nature, the impact of such work is much harder to evaluate in terms of effects, although it undoubtedly contains the potential to have significant effects since it entails shifting the broader balance of state and public policy and attitudes, with the commensurately larger resources that these involve.

Direct coordination between CSOs is more common in indirect activities, partly because of the narrower set of options open but mostly because the importance of volume. CSOs working on refugees and migration are a small sub-set of all CSOs and any even smaller sub-set of social, economic and political actors trying to influence public debate and public policy: their voice is easily drowned out. Cooperating on major pushes – often tied to the production of key reports or to socially-significant events (like the so-called 2015 migration crisis in the EU) – offers the best chance to be both heard and engaged with by central political institutions. Alongside these direct and indirect activities, nearly all the CSOs in the sample also undertake fund-raising work. Even when they have other sources of funding – for example from the UNHCR or national governments – groups have an interest in broadening their financial base, both as a means of doing more and as an insurance for potential blockages to that funding, an issue that was noted by several CSOs as increasingly likely in the economic turbulence post-Covid. As our desk-based survey underlined, the need to demonstrate the value of supporting groups is critical and in most cases there is a substantial investment in an online presence that showcases direct and indirect activities: likewise, all but the smallest groups appear to employ personnel in communications and/or fundraising, reflecting the centrality of continuing financing to maintain their activity base.

In the absence of systematic data on the size of CSOs, it is hard to draw firm conclusions about the impact of this on the type or volume of activities. However, it is apparent that groups with multiple countries of operation (which implies a larger resource base to support such work) are able to conduct both a bigger volume of direct activities and are engaged in significant indirect activities, particularly around lobbying and campaigning. We argue that this is due to the increased salience of such indirect work when direct activities are on a scale and/or across a variety of statal spaces that produces a need to engage more actively with relevant actors. In the case of humanitarian relief, groups such as the Red Cross or Oxfam benefit directly from institutionalised relations with national governments and international organisations as they move resources across borders: by contrast, the smallest CSOs – working on a single site – might have no need at all to work with any other than local government officials, as seen in the case of Italian or Greek groups working in refugee camps.

4.3. Impact of different conceptualisations of refugees, driven by underlying attitudes

The qualitative research that preceded this current report highlighted the importance of two key dimensions in distinguishing the attitudes and thus activities of CSOs (Usherwood *et al*, 2022). It is useful here to rehearse these before moving to the analysis.

The first dimension can be referred to as ‘worldview’: whether refugees and migrants are a category in themselves, or rather (partial) representatives of another category. In the former case, refugees and migrants are defined by their status as refugees and migrants: typically, this points to a holistic understanding by CSOs of their needs and situation, prompting a broader range of work that relates to them. By contrast, CSOs do not have this conceptualisation, then they will engage with refugees and migrants rather differently. In the case of humanitarian bodies, these individuals will only fall within their remit as and when they have humanitarian issues: thus, a refugee might only be of relevance to that CSO for a part of their time as a refugee, or even not at all if they avoid the many challenges that refugees frequently experience. For groups that see refugees and migrants as ‘foreigners’ or ‘outsiders’ (as thus as antagonistic), the engagement will be different again, only occurring as these individuals arrive in destination countries or as they do not ‘fit into’ their new communities: the differences in such groups’ response to the inflows to the EU of Syrian refugees from Belarus in 2021 and that of Ukrainians in the wake of Russia’s invasion in 2022 highlights the point.

This starts to draw out the second key dimension, relating back to the cleavage theory that animates the PROTECT project (Sicakkan 2021). This assumes that individuals and organisations can be divided into one of four broad sets of attitudes towards protection. *Nativists* focus exclusively on the protection of existing members of their national community and see no role – or even need – for international protection, since obligations stop at the metaphorical water’s edge. *Nation-statists* are potentially more open to notions of universal human rights and/or the protection of refugees, but still place primacy on their own state’s freedom to operationalise those as they see best: international protection is at most an idea, rather than a set of obligatory requirements. A third group, *regionalists*, are willing to work beyond national borders to create local systems of governance, often reflecting an understanding of the limits of what any one state can achieve: in part this is about sincere concern for human rights but is also a vehicle of *realpolitik*. Even the final group – *globalists* – with their desire for an internationalised and globalised system of protection are not always driven by a reification of human rights as an inescapable and fundamental duty for all (although that view is also present): it can also be a function of a failure of alternative policies to manage particular situations, such as massive inflows of refugees.

These two dimensions clearly interact with each other, as has already been outlined above, but it is important to note that this interaction is somewhat asymmetric. While any of the four cleavage groups can understand refugees and migrants as representatives of another

category, we find minimal evidence that nativist or nation-statist CSOs treat these individuals as a category in themselves. This is largely due to the dominance of national identity within their worldview, which tends to make it harder to view refugees or migrants as anything other than non-nationals or ‘outsiders’ to a national community.

In considering the conceptualisation of CSOs regarding their preferred outcomes regarding migration, just 3.1 percent of surveyed groups for whom we have data perceive refugees in negative terms; the majority of these are UK-based (Table 3). A further 39.1 percent do not have distinct preferred outcomes regarding migration. However, 57.8 percent of the CSOs for whom we have data on preferred outcomes do possess distinct perspectives. The majority (44.5 percent) identify refugees as being distinct cases of their own; CSOs in this category would like to see an end to exploitation specific to migrant communities, and would like to see more targeting of assistance towards vulnerable migrant sub-communities – particularly in relation to gender. A further 13.3 percent of CSOs perceive refugees as being a community indicative of wider humanitarian needs; here groups frame a need for wider humanitarianism and a need to resolve inequalities.

Table 3: Importance of refugees, asylum-seeking and migration, on basis of how CSO conceptualise refugees

	Issue		
	<i>Refugees</i>	<i>Asylum Seekers</i>	<i>Migration</i>
<i>CSOs seeing refugees as case in themselves</i>			
Essential	52.6% (30)	45.6% (26)	47.4% (27)
Quite important	21.1% (12)	24.6% (14)	28.1% (16)
Neutral	0% (0)	1.8% (1)	3.5% (2)
Not very important	24.6% (14)	24.6% (14)	17.5% (10)
Not at all important	1.8% (1)	3.5% (2)	3.5% (2)
<i>CSOs seeing refugees as humanitarian case</i>			
Essential	23.5% (4)	23.5% (4)	29.4% (5)
Quite important	47.1% (8)	47.1% (8)	41.2% (7)
Neutral	11.8% (2)	5.9% (1)	0% (0)
Not very important	17.6% (3)	23.5% (4)	23.5% (4)
Not at all important	0% (0)	0% (0)	0% (0)

Note: figures in table are percentages. N for refugees as case = 17, themselves, 57

For CSOs who perceive refugees as a case of their own, the majority see migration as quite important or essential for their work. Indeed, almost half of CSOs with this understanding of refugees see migration as essential to their work. The figures differ for economic migration however, with individualistic CSOs perceiving economic migration to be of less importance than migration on the whole. 21.1% of refugee CSOs with individualistic views of refugees do not see economic migration as being important to them at all. CSOs who perceive refugees to be an example of humanitarian need show again that migration in general is perceived to be more important by CSOs than economic migration, with 76.8% seeing it as quite important or essential, whereas 61.62% see economic migration as quite important or essential. There is comparatively little difference importance for either CSOs with humanitarian or individualistic perceptions of refugees and asylum seekers.

These different framings are also reflected in a difference in activities. For example, of those CSOs providing emotional and mental health support, 69% see refugees as a case in their own right, against 15.4% of those with the humanitarian frame (others being neutral). Financial support is pretty much evenly weighted in each frame (45.5% for case-in-themselves against 54.5% for humanitarians). For CSOs who conduct resettlement activities, 75% have the

individual frame for refugees: equivalent values are 60% of those providing training and education, 58% of those offering shelter, 66.7% of those doing search and rescue. However, 66.7% of CSOs offering medical assistance are neutral. This suggests that direct activities that are more likely to be of a kind that refugees will disproportionately access will be more likely to see refugees as a case-in-themselves. This is also seen in indirect activities: 54.5% of those lobbying have the case-in-themselves frame, as are 52.4% of those doing briefings and 54.5% of those engaging with media.

Thus, while CSOs seeing refugees as a case in themselves display without exception in our sample a full spectrum of direct and indirect activities that touch on refugee issues, those that take a humanitarian frame can have a more limited portfolio of work that applies. In the former case, precisely because refugees are the structuring concept, there is a clear incentive both to touch on multiple parts of the refugees' individual experience and situation and to connect this to indirect campaigning and lobbying, since these activities also have a bearing. Thus Care4Calais, a small CSO operating across the English Channel, provides humanitarian relief and education services in France and Belgium, as well as resettlement support in the UK and lobbying of all three national governments on the conditions individuals face. By contrast, humanitarian groups are often coming to refugees on a tangent and so either do not have the capacity to engage in multiple activities that touch on refugees or do not have the incentive: consider the work of groups such as Doctors Without Frontiers or SOS Méditerranée, which undertake very particular work – medical support and search-and-rescue respectively – that does not lend itself to a broad-spectrum approach to refugees. In simpler terms, humanitarian groups are organised by theme while refugee groups are organised by identification of individuals. This further reinforces the importance of understanding the CSO landscape in the round, given the multiple conceptualisations that groups hold of their target groups and audiences.

We also note that our surveys identified a number of CSOs with more passive formulations of humanitarian issues, largely as a function of not being primarily directed towards such work. Bodies such as the International Olympic Committee or other sporting bodies fall within this category. Their connection is limited to providing space for refugee teams to compete or – in fewer cases – to funding those athletes in their training and competition costs. While such work embodies a positive a globalist view of human rights, it is debatable how far this addresses international protection more specifically. Evidence from the desk-based survey does point up the dangers that can result from well-intentioned action by non-specialised groups (e.g. Treloar 2022)

In this section we have only considered globalist or regionalist groups so far. While the surveys did identify nativist or nation-statist CSOs that had some connection to media and social media debates on refugees and migration, very few of these engaged in any activity that directly or indirectly related to these groups *per se*. Nativist groups such as BritainFirst have undertaken protests and demonstrations that include refugees and asylum-seekers among their targets, but framing these are exemplars of a broad collection of non-native threats. What has been fully absent from the sample is any example of a group that frames refugees or migrants antagonistically and that makes them the sole (or even primary) focus of their activities. It is suggested here that this is a function of their nativism or nation-statism: international protection is not a priority in these frames, so logically some other organising concept will be more important, which in turn produces CSO formation that maps on to that concept. While globalists and regionalists will form and shape themselves directly to meet the imperatives of the logic of international protection and so make that their primary focus, this is absent for nativists or nation-statists. This is also apparent in the absence of any nativist or nation-statist groups operating across national borders or in the international sphere: the necessary primacy of the domestic realm makes such work meaningless.

4.4. The limited presence of the GCR/GCM in the CSO landscape

One of the objectives of the surveys was to understand better how the Global Compacts on Refugees and on Migration (GCR/GCM) have impacted the CSO landscape. A key part of the Global Compact process had been to draw together public and civil society bodies in improving provision for refugees and migrants and there had been a body of lobbying work by CSOs to push forward the negotiation and conclusion of the Compacts' negotiation in 2018 (Triggs & Wall 2020; Ferris & Donato 2019; Arnold-Fernandez 2019). However, as global instruments, it has been unclear whether the Compacts have had any appreciable impact on CSOs.



While data on whether CSOs perceive the GCM and GCR is missing in approximately 15% of cases, the results for those with data indicates near unison amongst CSOs – namely that more than 60% of them express no overt attitude towards the Global Compacts. 17.9% and 18.5% have a positive attitude towards the Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees respectively. In terms of frequency, Italian organisations comprise the largest proportion of the negative responses (33.3%), followed by the UK (22.2%).


A minority of CSOs surveyed were involved in the development of the GCM, with only 9.3% stating that they had had any involvement; the figures for involvement in the GCR are fractionally higher at 15.4%: in all cases, it was only the largest groups like the Red Cross or Amnesty International that noted their involvement; a reflection of the global scale of the negotiations and the need for specialist resources and access. Where CSOs stated that they had been involved in either GCM or GCR, the dominant activity was implementation based: even here there was very little detail as to what this has involved. The most common statements made by groups – again, all larger bodies – was that implementation by *states* had been very uneven and limited, which made it very difficult for the CSOs themselves to make much use of the Compacts' provisions: typically, CSOs were pushing for more work by states either to honour their current Compact commitments or to strengthen the implementation and enforcement mechanisms. This fitted into a more general critique of the international order and the weakening resolve of states even to abide by the obligations under the UN Convention, which CSOs take as an essential precursor to the Compacts.

As such the Compacts appear to be a relatively unimportant part of CSOs' work. Large groups did contribute to CSOs appear to be willing to advance the cause of the Compacts and made various efforts to constructively engage in the negotiation process, but the lack of state follow-up has left them without much scope to progress further, given that partnership requires local state implementation and enforcement. Those groups that did not get involved in this phase have had little cause to become interested or involved subsequently: the international frameworks still hang on the UN Convention, which has more force of law behind it than the Compacts are currently planned to, so there is little utility in making much of the GCR/GCM at present. Even the opportunity to use the Compacts as an additional lever to shape public policy seems to be largely absent in our sample and there is little sign that this will change unless and until states become more engaged.

5. A summary model

This report has exposed the complexity of the landscape for Civil Society Organisations connected to refugees and migrants. It has considered the impact of the internal motivations and resourcing of groups, as well as the external opportunity structure at the national and international level and the (limited) impact of the shifts in international commitments driven by the Global Compacts. The interplay of these factors is also a significant factor, so it makes sense to present in this final section a more summary consideration of CSOs' organisation and positioning, in order to integrate earlier elements. Figures 3-5 represent this summary model.





The volume and variety of CSOs identified by the present surveys precludes a single diagrammatic representation of all groups, so in the interests of accessibility they have been split out on the basis of their underlying attitudes (using Sicakkan’s cleavage model (2021)) and their framing of refugees.

Each diagram represents the national-international space within which groups can operate. Groups with only a single country of operations are placed within one of the red boxes, which symbolises a state: for groups which have limited cross-border activity, they are situated across state borders. Those groups with an international/global mission sit in the blue, international box. The two exceptions to this are the ICRC, with its unique operating model of a global core body and autonomous (but coordinated) national sections, and the handful of national refugee councils (as in Denmark) which conduct significant international (and bilateral) work from a strongly defined national base.

These national and international spaces are further differentiated by the types of activities that are undertaken within them. This matches the split between direct (e.g. emergency aid, case work) and indirect (e.g. lobbying, public campaigning) activity outlined above in this report. The diagrams represent the mix of groups that focus on a single type of activity and those that span across a wide range of work.

Finally, groups are differentiated by the extent to which refugees or migrants form a significant part of their work. This is determined by whether they indicate in their promotional materials and in media coverage that such work is closely connected to their core mission rather than any arbitrary quantification of the work itself. In practice this mostly serves to differentiate nativist and nation-statist groups from the rest (figure 3), since none of these undertake direct actions in relation to refugees or migrants and limit themselves to campaigning about more generic issues around immigration, in which refugees and migrants are functions of national policymaking, rather than objects of interest in themselves.

Despite their much more marginal role within this landscape, nativist and nation-statist CSOs still require attention, since their core work often focuses on shaping and shifting national

political and public debates, contesting the field for regionalist and globalist CSOs that are concerned about the effective provision of protection to refugees and migrants. Given the central role of governments within international policymaking, this contestation can have global repercussions.

Much more dominant in the CSO landscape are those groups with regionalist and globalists attitudes, all of which engage in some form of work to aid or support refugees and migrants. As noted above, in practice globalists attitudes are predominant here, not least because the bulk of resourcing and activity is situated within humanitarian-framed groups, which are definitionally globalist. Figure 2 maps out a rich landscape of such CSOs, anchored in many respects by the ICRC by virtue of its resource base and its institutionalised integration into governmental and intergovernmental structures. At both the international and national levels we find humanitarian groups operating a wide range of spreads of activity, from healthcare to sea rescues and from education to disaster relief. What defines and differentiates these from the refugee-framing groups is that such work is understood as a response to a humanitarian need, in which refugees or migrants might be part of the target population, but not necessarily all refugees or migrants and not necessarily only refugees or migrants.

By contrast, refugee-framing groups take interest in these individuals because of the status, and so present a distinctive organisational form, in two ways. Firstly, refugee-framing groups are much rarer than humanitarian groups in all of the countries surveyed and in the international domain. This is because refugees and migrants present a wide range of humanitarian concerns (so attracting the attention of such groups) but can be defined as refugees or migrants in a very limited number of ways (the former primarily by the Convention). Secondly, all refugee-framing groups in our survey adopt a full-spectrum approach to their work, with both direct and indirect activities. Again, this reflects their interest in the full life-cycle of being a refugee or migrant, from their initial displacement to their ultimate relocation and integration into a host community: humanitarian groups typically only intervene at key junctures in this journey. Indirect work thus becomes integral to ensuring a broader supportive environment for these individuals to complete their transition.

Finally, and most obviously, the particularities of refugees' and migrants' needs and situations has driven the creation of a particular organisational form: the refugee council. As noted above, states such as Denmark and Norway (and sub-national units like Scotland) have found it useful to create a single organisational focus for refugee matters, in which member organisations can simultaneously coordinate and amplify their work in this field. The network effects of such bodies tend to draw in all relevant activity, leaving minimal refugee-framed CSO work outside the council. This is analogous to the role of the UNHCR itself which predominates in the international space, even more than the ICRC in the humanitarian field: Those refugee-framing CSOs that do exist internationally all exhibit strong interactions with the UNHCR, which itself works in many ways like a CSO despite its intergovernmental organisation status.

As a last note on this model, the levels of interconnection are high within this CSO community. This is especially so in the international space and within individual state spaces: numerous examples of joint campaigns or fieldwork exist across the surveyed groups. Even nativist and nation-statist groups have demonstrated some links within themselves. Such connections reflect the fuzzy boundaries of where interests lie and the imposed constraints of funding: as the refugee council model has shown, the pooling of resources can generate impacts well beyond the individual contributions of member bodies.

6. Policy Implications

The aim of this report is not solely to produce a model of CSO activity in and around international protection, but also to consider how this might help inform the attitudes and behaviour of key stakeholders on the ground. Already in the introduction, we highlighted a number of key findings that bear repeating here:

- Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) form a highly diverse network of interconnecting groups that provide a very wide range of direct support to refugees and migrants, as well as engaging in extensive advocacy work;
- All CSOs in our sample that undertake direct support work hold broadly positive views of refugees and migrants, with a world view that is either regionalist or (much more usually) globalist in outlook;
- CSOs that see refugees as a case in themselves are more likely to undertake a broad spectrum of work than are those that frame refugees as examples of humanitarian work;
- Very few nativist or nation-statist CSOs undertake any activities relating directly or indirectly towards refugees or migrants, and those that do treat these groups as part of a wider set of targets;
- The Global Compacts on Refugees and on Migration remain very peripheral to the work of CSO, primarily because they perceive a lack of state buy-in to their effective implementation.

These findings carry a number of policy implications that can be described as follows:

- **The capacity and disposition of CSOs to provide direct support to refugees and migrants cannot be ignored by other stakeholders.** Even in the most developed public sector systems (which are themselves highly nationally segmented and very rare) there is insufficient scope to meet the full range of needs of refugees and migrants in the course of their transitions from point of origin to point of destination. The necessarily trans-border nature of these individuals places strong limits on the ability or willingness of public bodies to provide a more continuous provision, limits that are much less among CSOs. Moreover, the organisational specialisation and flexibility of CSOs mean that they can more efficiently and effectively deliver support than can public sector bodies that typically have to work within a broader set of regulatory, budgetary and organisational constraints;
- **Efforts to improve the representation of refugees and migrants themselves in policy-making and governance could profitably be directed (in part) via CSOs.** The bottom-up nature of the very large majority of CSOs – emerging from individuals' concerns and interests – makes them well-positioned to capture and represent the views and priorities of refugees and migrants. CSOs have very extensive direct contact with these individuals and have both an interest in and a capacity to adjust themselves to the needs of those individuals: alongside groups formed by refugees and migrants themselves, CSOs working on these issues are well able to inform public policy and the evolving international regime, especially in the context of the Global Compacts;
- **The diversity of CSO forms and interests requires policy-makers and other partners to be aware of the implications of different framings.** As this report has highlighted, there is a key distinction between groups that see refugees as a case in themselves and those that see them as exemplars of humanitarian need: these two clusters conceive of the priorities and their role in meeting those rather differently. Consequently, public bodies need to engage closely with current and potential CSO partners in order to understand the particular ways in which these conceptualise and

operationalise policy and actions. The trade-off of CSO specialisation is that it cannot be assumed that a group that works well on one element of international protection will be able to translate that to other elements;

- **Public financing of CSOs is a double-edge sword.** Many of the CSOs in our sample have some form of financing from public bodies, either nationally or internationally. Typically, this comes in the form of project grants to support particular defined activities. Such financing is evidently very important, judging by the (limited) information that our survey found, and sustains those CSOs to an extent that would not be easily replaceable by other sources. More generally, the bottom-up nature of CSOs makes them relatively susceptible to funding crises, especially when operating in territories where their work does not have anything more than official toleration. At the same time, public financing is not without its issues: funders' priorities might not fully align with CSOs', so compromising the long-time ability of the groups to maintain the bottom-up support that they require to draw in workers and supporters. Moreover, the public sector requirements of financing can tend to reduce the ability of CSOs to adapt to changing needs: this can be reflected in CSOs' agency to adjust delivery, project target flexibility and reporting requirements. Therefore, a good level of understanding and trust between funders and CSOs is optimal for sustainable and effective delivery;
- **GCR/GCM implementation cannot be separated from the general enforcement of the international legal order.** CSOs have been very active advocates of the international regime that centres on the Convention, and larger groups did make efforts to shape and advance the Global Compacts. The evidence is that those Compacts have still to make much impact in operational terms, partly through limited knowledge among medium- and small-sized CSOs, but mostly because all CSOs see the international regime as a whole as being under threat from states and their unwillingness to actively pursue enforcement. The Convention remains a much more legally powerful tool than the Compacts for CSOs to leverage public policy and so remains their primary focus: there is a desire to make the most of the partnership elements within the Compacts, but this needs partners in the form of states. Those states and relevant international organisations could readily build effective relations with CSOs on the Compacts if they so desired, as long as there is built on substantive action across the board on international protection.

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